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Each month the Editor hopes that he will catch up on himself, and that subscribers will receive each number, as they used to, 'on or about the first of the month', but life always proves recalcitrant, and each month he hopes that perhaps the next, or now, perhaps next year. Meanwhile there is nothing to do but press on with what is to be done, and to hope that subscribers will continue as understanding and indeed indulgent as they have been in the past. Only he will not give the not uncommon response to queries about retirement, that he is busier than ever before, as that provokes the deserved reply that he cannot then have worked very hard when in employment.

Students and teaching he finds he misses less than he had expected, though an Extension Studies course of seven lectures, six of them with slides, in three days proved that the hand, or voice, had not lost its cunning. He has been struck of late by what is almost a contradiction in the profession, between what its members do for themselves, which is to write scholarly articles and books, and what they do for their employer, which is, increasingly, teach Classical Studies. Not, of course, that their employers do not require of them the former, or that the division is a new one. There have always been ambitious persons who, realising that the path to advancement lay through publication, did as little teaching as they could persuade their conscientious colleagues to do for them, and Malcolm Willcock in his obituary in the last issue lamented the undervaluing of the type of scholar John Creed represented.

But the Editor at least, both when he was taught and, he hopes, when he was teaching, was conscious of a continuum that started with the teaching of elementary Greek and ended with the books of his masters, and not of the division that he now finds. Classical Studies, it seems to him, started as a device to keep up student numbers when fewer entrants, even those with A levels, possessed the linguistic competence to pursue the traditional classics course, and the tail now seems to be wagging the dog. There is certainly a place for Popular Classics, to persuade the public that the subject is worth preserving, but we do not yet require Scientific Departments to run courses in Popular Science.

A subscriber in exile, as he described himself, has thanked the Editor for the accounts he gives of life in Classics Departments in this country. But the Editor has always been inhibited, first by the injunction that to publish information might damage negotiations in

progress, and now that he has retired, by the convention that you do not foul the nest that you have left. Not but what he has in the past proved competent in Delphic language, and hopes that readers may still be able, at times, to read between the lines.

There is not, in this country, the lively debate about the future and content of classics that is carried out in the United States (the Editor's discussion of *Classics, a discipline and a profession in crisis* is still, alas, pending). Such debate is there a sign of life, and the Editor was mildly shocked to read in the latest number of the *CUCD Bulletin* a fable by "Prodikos", 'The choice of Heracles' in which those who have gone from this country to the United States are seen as 'mere names without substance', and in fact, what shocks him more, a Latin note named names: '*tangit historias J.C. McKeownii, I. Rutherfordii, S. Hindsii aliorumque*'. Heracles in the fable, as in its original, chooses Virtue, and appears to represent two people, for the statement that 'his friends in Britain were awfully glad to have him back' is also footnoted, but naming only places, not persons: '*utrum Dunelmum an Bristolium intellegendum sit incertum*'. The Editor therefore, mindful of the old army maxim 'No names, no packdrill' refrains from identification. But he deprecates both the self-satisfaction and the anti-Americanism chauvinism exhibited in the fable.

The Dinosaur is old enough still to believe in the Republic of Letters, and migration both temporary and permanent in either direction across the Atlantic and indeed, and he hopes increasingly, into Europe and beyond, can only benefit us and our studies. He notes that many a potential Heracles is happy to visit and to report on his return, congratulating himself on having resisted the blandishments, as no doubt did Odysseus on his return from Calypso. But his was enforced hospitality, absolving him from the proper courtesies of a guest.

But let not readers interpret these remarks as a veiled bid for offers, attractive as would be a stint at an American University to a retired Ulysses of an academic who still has some life left in him. But what would happen to *LCM*?



Bob Develin (Ottawa): *Appreciating Aristophanes*

LCM 15.9 (Nov. 1990), 130-131

Normally one would let reviews slide by if one were not in sympathy with them: that's the reviewer's opinion and so be it. In this case I cannot so restrain myself. The piece in question is Professor MacDowell on K.J. Reckford, *Aristophanes' Old-and-new Comedy* Vol.1, in *Classical Review* 39 (1989), 16-17. My reasons for being obstreperous are as follows: (1) Reckford's book is the most enjoyable work in Classics that I have read in a long, long time, perhaps ever; (2) when I did read it, I had a feeling that a review of this kind would appear; (3) factors (1) and (2) lead me to sense that there is a question here of what is and is not permissible in publications in our disciplines. My answer to that latter question is, in brief, that the list of what is permissible should be almost indefinitely long, that of what is not minimal at best. It should be realised here that I am thinking in terms of approach and form not of what one may summarise as quality, which, subjective as judgement may ultimately be, nonetheless does have some controls.

What I find engaging about the book is what, I think, MacDowell, for all his admission of Reckford's love of Aristophanes and enthusiasm, finds to be fault. One's appreciation of a work of drama or literature is very much a personal matter and, indeed, a matter of personality: that I can lose myself in *War and Peace* and another declare it boring is a reflection of just that. And in a way that is healthy, as it ought to prevent us accepting a work as 'great' just because tradition and scholarship pronounce it so. I believe Reckford has grasped just this point. He has his appreciation of Aristophanes and he wants to write about it. In order to do so he has examined the roots of his appreciation, his ways of thinking about it and even the mechanics of writing his thoughts. Instead of forgetting all this and adopting the mask of apparent objectivity, he has revealed them to the reader so that the well-springs of his approach may be better comprehended. In a sense he takes the reader on a journey with him. My own response to this is that he has succeeded and has brought Aristophanes to life as comic drama which does affect the receptor personally within the context of his or her experience. On a basic level, the fact that we are Classicists gives us an entrée into Aristophanes not shared by the mass of people, yet this need not work to subdue our responses as individual human beings as well. And it is surely within our mandate to communicate those responses as publishers and teachers.

For MacDowell the author is 'prolix and discursive' – has he not the right to be if he feels this best puts across the nature of his appreciation? 'He jogs along in an easy-going avuncular manner, as if he and his readers had all the time in the world' – he may decide how much time he has and needs and this reader at least regards it as time well spent. 'Consequently some of Aristophanes' plays do not get as much discussion as they deserve, and alternative interpretations of them are not considered fully. The book would have been more effective if he had concentrated more rigorously on the real problems of interpreting Aristophanes.' This is central. Is the amount of discussion the plays deserve determined by some objective criterion? Rather may the author decide that question within his perception of his task. Do we always have to consider all the alternative interpretations in detail when we know what our own feelings are and wish them to be to the fore? (No-one, I hope, would wish to suggest that Reckford is ill-informed in this respect). Are we to take it as self-evident that there is a palpable canon of 'the real problems of interpreting Aristophanes'? What I see here, frankly, is a recipe for a self-perpetuating rigidity and insularity which we can hardly afford and which is a negation of what academic development and expansion ought to be.

If Reckford has tried to surmount the perennial problem of period jokes by replacing them with modern equivalents, he has been honest about it and does not deserve censure. From his position in what he is attempting to do, it is hardly surprising that he uses 'Americanizations'. We come to the centre again: 'Entertaining the readers is all very well, but scholarly study ought to be based on what Aristophanes actually wrote.' Even given the apparent sense of the second part of that statement, ought not every 'ought' in our profession be open to debate, if not at its core, at least around its margins? And Reckford is surely not merely entertaining his readers, but attempting to communicate something – this communication is anything but easy. MacDowell finds phrases 'which are too vague to be any use to a reader.' That is at best overstatement, but allow me to suggest that in writing about literature one may employ expressions which communicate in a manner similar to the power of literature itself, that is through words which create an emotive, pictorial impression beyond the specific. This creates the possibility of misunderstanding, but it is an alternative to the incomplete, second-best to which we often resort when we cannot find the perfect words to describe our feelings. It has a power which transcends the world of the literal commentator.

And talking of commentary, that is what MacDowell treats us to for one-third of his review, choosing a paragraph and inserting in square brackets his remarks. This really is the Classicist in operation, with a literal-mindedness which fails to do justice to the author's intent. I resist the temptation to provide a commentary on MacDowell's commentary, simply urging readers to see for themselves that however justifiable his comments are on a *literal* level, they fail to perceive the overall intent of Reckford's words. But the end of the review cannot be ignored: 'What has happened, I fear, is that R. has decided on his conclusions in advance . . . and wants to make everything fit them.' It is not uncommon to meet with that sort of statement, but I feel it is to misconceive the scholar's *modus operandi*. Do any of us write as we go through material? Do we not examine our subject, see what conclusions we come to as a result of our experience and then give written shape to ideas so formed? Do we not, therefore, decide on our conclusions in advance of the final writing? And with this book in particular we do not have to do much guesswork to discover how the author has come to this point. This must not be confused with the question of whether we consider an author's conclusions right or wrong.

Let it be emphasised finally that there is more to this than an objection to a single review. It is a matter of attitude within our profession which I believe requires serious thought. I therefore reiterate the plea I made in *The Ancient History Bulletin* 2 (1988), 125ff., for flexibility and tolerance on the part of the profession in general, but particularly from those who have a say in deciding on publication and those who venture opinions on others' work in print. It will be of considerable interest to see other reviews of Reckford's book. It is always of interest to study the nature of reviews in general – but that is a tale to wag another time.

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James Fettes (Headington, Oxford): *Aristophanes, Frogs 754-5 and 786-791*

LCM 15.9 (Nov. 1990), 132-138

754 . . . ἔμβαλέ μοι τὴν δεξιάν,
755 καὶ δὲ κῦσαι καὶ τὸς κῦσον . .

786 . . . κάπειτα πῶς;
787 οὐ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἀντελάβετο τοῦ θρόνου;
788 μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐκεῖνος ἀλλ' ἔκυσε μὲν Αἰσχύλου,
789 ὅτε δὴ κατῆλθε, κἀνέβαλε τὴν δεξιάν,
790 κἀκεῖνος ὑπεχώρησεν αὐτῷ τοῦ θρόνου.
791 νυνὶ δ' ἔμελλεν . . .

Aristophanes, *Frogs* 754-5 & 786-791

The first reaction of many of us to kissing in the *Frogs* is likely to be 'Well, yes, foreigners are like that, men kissing each other; they still do; nothing remarkable about that'. We may easily think too that if A kisses B, B kisses A, and that the kiss means the same to each, just as shaking hands – the modern equivalent to what the Greeks did – must be done by both. Consequently when soon after we find kissing again, we do not give it another thought. This is unfortunate, because, I think, the kiss in 788 requires more attention.

There should be three fixed points in these lines: (1) the subject of κατῆλθε is so obvious from the context that it does not need to be expressed, even if it is a change of subject; (2) κἀκεῖνος ought to represent a change of subject (and νυνὶ δέ would not normally do so); (3) as between two poets, one of whom the audience is being told is about to appear on stage, and the other is not going to take any part in the day's activities, the 'further away' should be the latter. It helps too if ἐκεῖνος in 790 is not a different person from ἐκεῖνος in 788.

Whatever Sophocles thought of Aeschylus' poetry, in point of character and behaviour we must accept μὰ Δι' οὐκ and what we know from elsewhere (and it was an audience of his contemporaries), that he was a modest and respectful individual. The idea of the junior poet, a new arrival in Hades what's more, marching up to the reigning laureate with hand outstretched, as if to say 'Put it there, old man' is not convincing¹.

The verb ὑπεχώρησεν by itself is inconclusive. The meeting occurred at the throne; they were both there together and either poet could be said to give place. At least I suppose they met there. I cannot say whether the Greeks believed, or pretended to believe, that just as the wicked were punished continuously, so the good formed a set of fixed *tableaux*, any more than that Christian hymn-writers are committed to thinking that angels sing 'Holy, Holy, Holy' and play harps non-stop for all eternity. Was it just a literary convention that whenever a new arrival or a rare spectator visits Hades, the person in question is at that moment 'doing his thing'? In theory they could have met anywhere in Hades and just discussed the laureateship. After all, ἀντελάβετο is treated (by LSJ) at both 777 and 787 as metaphorical, 'laid claim to', not even for Euripides involving any physical movement. So neither need 'withdraw'. An instance to support this meaning occurs in the debate on Pylos (Thuc. 4.28.2): οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν, δεδιὼς ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. Resignation does not involve any physical action. (What it does, if it is relevant at all, is to

¹ The function of δεξία in the Greek drama, even where an imperative is used (δός, ἔμβαλλε, δρεξον), is almost exclusively as a guarantee of truthful and merciful dealing, where one party is quite dependent on the other. Taking hands seems to be very rare. The discovery of a mutual interest, when Clytemnestra learns that Achilles is to join the family (Eur. *IA* 831), is the nearest we get to Xanthias' 'Shake on it! He and Aeacus, as if in a game of Snap!', are already on terms of equality; the clasping of hands is only the outward manifestation of the position. The hand in welcome or in recognition of equality are both possible from Aeschylus to Sophocles, but the situation and the character of Sophocles are presented as not compatible with either in reverse.

settle the issue about sharing; when one resigns in favour of another, the result is that one is there instead of the other, not in addition.²) There admittedly Nicias gave up what he previously had, which Sophocles could not do; he could only decline. But then Thucydides uses the word more often in a military context for withdraw (e.g. 3.97.3 *ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐπεκείντο . . . διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί*), to advance so far and then retire, which, if the meeting took place at the throne, is just what I consider Sophocles did.

If *κακείνος* does not involve a change of subject, it seems virtually impossible that, if Aristophanes had intended simply to say that Sophocles kissed Aeschylus, offered his hand, and withdrew, he would have imported such difficulty by adding *ἐκείνος* to a sentence which could not have been clearer without it. The only reason then for *ἐκείνος* would seem to be that *ὅτε δὴ κατήλαθ* recalls the same words in 771 (which the audience are presumed to remember), and Aeacus is saying that Sophocles, unlike Euripides, made no claim to the throne. This is in fact the argument of P.T.Stevens in *CR* ns5 (1955), 235-7, which is accepted by W.B.Stanford (Macmillan 1958) as the best solution available. In several matters of detail I find that Stevens and I are in agreement; but I am not convinced on the main point which I do not think depends on the interpretation of *κακείνος* alone. But against Stevens, *ὑποχωρεῖν* means (whether physically or metaphorically) withdraw from where you are already, and if the purpose now is to emphasise that Sophocles did not do what Euripides did, it would need instead to mean to decide not to try to go any further ahead. This meaning might be better suited by *τὸν θρόνον*. Perhaps this is an unreal distinction, but in any case it does not overturn the main argument on which my thesis rests, that Sophocles is unsuitable as the subject of the other verbs *ἔκυσσε* and *ἐνέβαλε*, a thesis which incidentally rules out the summary solution of deleting line 790.

Aeschylus and Euripides were to contend for the throne, and it was a throne for one (*τὸν ἀριστον . . . ἑτέρος τις*). The very idea of two men sharing one man's chair cannot escape being ludicrous. Was he going to share his free dinner (764) with Sophocles too? Even if serious, LSJ (s.v., 1.2.b) seem confused. Plutarch's Spartan boys in the streets presumably deferred to their elders absolutely, not consented to let them have as much space as they claimed for themselves. Herodotus' words for them (2.80.1) are *εἰκουσι τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἐκτράπονται*. But this is noted as exceptional. Would LSJ have us suppose that in other Greek cities the youths allowed their elders no room at all on the streets? The analogy, implying 'for as long as was required', would rather suit the idea that Aeschylus surrendered the throne for the duration of the *ἀγών* only. But this does not agree with Sophocles making himself scarce but willing to come out of retirement if needed.

It is not to be imagined that when Pluto instructed his joiner to make a chair for the best poet, he told him to allow for the possibility of joint winners. But really I should have thought that it was of the essence of the word throne, that he who sits upon it has no equal. Moreover Xanthias has to have the throne explained to him (761ff.). By theatrical practice this means that the audience need to have it explained to them. So how were they to know in 790 that the throne, which they had never heard of until a moment ago, was a two-seater not a single, unless the verb *ὑποχωρεῖν* meant in common usage to give a share of? Here we are back with LSJ but this, I hold, begs the question. So although *ὑπεχώρησεν*, if taken alone, could be construed with either poet as subject, taking into account the other actions it seems perverse not to refer a word whose primary meaning is physically withdraw, to the one in the sequel did do that.

Again, why was Sophocles not still sitting there? And if he were now joint holder, it would be up to Euripides on the second round to challenge him, not he Euripides. If Aeschylus had accepted Euripides' challenge, but before the contest could be held had surrendered the

² van Leeuwen: *in sedem quam satis amplam fuisse libenter credimus eum recepit*. LSJ *ὑποχωρέω* 2.b *κακείνος ὑποχώρησεν αὐτῷ τοῦ θρόνου* he (Aeschylus) gave Sophocles a share of the throne, *Ar. Ran.* 790 (not surrendered it, which would be *παρεχώρησεν*); *τοὺς πρεσβυτέροις ἐντρέπεσθαι . . . ὁδῶν ὑποχωροῦντας* making way for them on the streets (not 'retiring from the streets'), *Plu.* 2.237d.

(whole) throne to the newly-arrived Sophocles, he would have lost his match with Euripides by default; or, if you prefer, his contest with Euripides would not now have been for the throne. But the title-match is still on. The attempt to escape by translating 'made as if to surrender' does not help, not only because this is normally an idiom of the imperfect, but because the character of Aeschylus would not let him take the risk of having his offer accepted. But if Aeschylus could not give up either the whole or the half, it must be Sophocles who gave way. Apart from anything else, lines 1515-19 (σὺ δὲ τὸν θάκον τὸν ἐμὸν παράδος Σοφοκλεῖ τηρεῖν . . . τοῦτον γὰρ ἐγὼ σοφίᾳ κρίνω δεύτερον εἶναι) would be impossible if Sophocles were already there. Revision of the text for performance may make some inconsistency unavoidable. Nevertheless to a people as competitive as the Greeks second is not equal first, and we are entitled to read back into the earlier passage what Aristophanes thought was Aeschylus' view of modesty or comparison with himself. The implication of (766) *ἕως ἀφίκοιτο* . . . *ἑτέρως τις*, (769) *ἐκεῖνος εἶχε* . . . , (771) *ὅτε δὴ κατήλθ' Εὐριπίδης*, is that Aeschylus had held the throne undefeated and probably unchallenged since 456 B.C.. We may consider whether this would be likely to induce a feeling of continued superiority or immediate surrender now.

To return now to the kiss. There are several instances of this in the *Odyssey*, which may serve as better guides to its meaning in a serious context than the clowning of Xanthias and Aeacus. These all show the kiss as part of an act of welcome. They include mother to son, grandmother to grandson, wife to husband, old retainers and women servants to young master and to old master.³ So the kiss as showing respect to a superior cannot of itself be ruled out, and might be argued so here, but for two considerations. Apart from *Od.* 21.225, where Odysseus simply returns the welcome of his servants in the previous line, and 24.320, where he kisses his father like a stranger, because his father has not recognised him, the kiss is always given to the one who has returned or arrived by the one who has been there all the time. The second consideration is the taking of hands. Though alone a kiss might betoken a degree of deference, a kiss so accompanied could not, because offering the hand implies equality or else condescension, something which only Aeschylus can concede.

Even if there had been any danger of confusion for the original audience over which poet did what, the actor by his emphasis or by miming his words could help, and perhaps even

³ <i>Od.</i>	16 15-21	Old retainer to young master (as father to son).
	17.35	Servants (f.) to young master.
	39	Mother to son.
	19.417	Grandmother to grandson.
	21.224	Old servants (m.) to master.
	225	Master to above.
	22.499	Servants (f.) to master.
	23.87	Wife to husband (mentally).
	208	Wife to husband.
	24.236	Son to father (mentally).
	320	Son to father.
	398	Old retainer to master.

Since Aristophanes says no more than 'kissed', the differences in Homer over what is kissed – head, shoulders, eyes, hands – are not material here. Herodotus records the social distinction among Persians of kissing the lips or the cheeks (1.134) and the taboo on any Egyptian kissing a Greek man on his lips (2.41.3). Aeschylus' only kiss is, imagined sarcastically, from Iphigeneia to her father, again on his arrival below (*Ag.* 1559). In Sophocles, only Oedipus would have liked to kiss Theseus in gratitude, if that had not been impossible between a just man and one accursed (*O.C.* 1131ff.). Euripides has kissing outside the family only in the drunken scene in *Cyclops* 553, 581, not to be treated seriously, where the name Ganymede is mentioned. Kisses in Aristophanes are either sexual (decent or not) or between parent and child. Of the only two exceptions, those between men, one (*Ran.* 755) is playing the fool. For a deliberate and serious action *Ran.* 788 is unique. The only kisses between men in the four dramatists not mentioned above are from (supposed) son to father (*Eur. Ion* 519 [hand] and *Ar. Eccl.* 647). It is the mention of people kissing that I have counted, whenever a kiss is either only contemplated or is described as occurring or actually takes place in view of an audience.

more in the manner of stretching out the hand, since (to return to our beginning) the action coming from Aeschylus would not be the same kind of thing as coming from Sophocles to him.

I believe supporting argument lies in *δτε δῆ*. This surely cannot mean simply *ἐπεί*, equally available metrically. (I do not think that *δτε* and *νυνί* are being opposed as mere points of time.⁴) Rather the English 'now that', with the implication of 'as expected', or 'at last', 'after all'.⁵ And this, of course, is from the viewpoint of inhabitants of the underworld, one of whom is speaking, so that Sophocles came down, not went down. Presumably Aeschylus said something to him, which would only have interrupted the narrative if Aeacus had recounted it now; something on a par with *ἦλθες, Τηλέμαχε* or later Virgil's *venisti tandem*.⁶ If I am right this, then 'now that he had come down (after such an extended life)' amounts to saying "to mark his arrival".

With all these pointers in the same direction the conclusion seems inescapable: the initiative in the kiss and the offer of the hand must come for Aeschylus. And the suggested solution is that the last word in 788 must be the nominative *Αίσχύλος*. Now all the requirements are met.

The reason for the origin of the corruption, if such it was, can only be a matter of speculation. Even if Aristophanes had to do some rewriting for production, he would not be likely to include an incongruity, though conceivably an actor might have done so. The reason for the acceptance of the mistake, I imagine, is that it has been taken for granted that we have here a plain case of *μέν* and *δέ*, deciding the subjects of the verbs. I have to suppose that here *μέν* just is not followed by *δέ*. Indeed I wonder whether it may have been a desire to regularise an apparent *μέν* and *δέ* that was the cause of a 'correction' to *Αίσχύλον*.⁷ The *δέ* of 791 serves only to connect the two elements in Sophocles' reaction. *μέν* followed by *καί* is not all that rare; Denniston (p.374) gives examples enough from various authors including Aristophanes. This is no obstacle to resolving the main difficulty.

The change of subject in 788 remains the one problem. In other cases where the formal pattern is subject and verb, conjunction, second verb, different subject, the meanings of the words can lead towards the change; and the presence of an expressed object makes it far less awkward. Here the call for emendation arises because the structured and the sense are at odds. The sequences 'No he didn't, but he kissed Aeschylus', and 'No he didn't, but Aeschylus kissed him', both make good sense. But it is only when we have heard the whole of the civilities that we know which is the correct sense. To go by the form, if a change of subject is not indicated, the audience will suppose, as far as *ἔκνυσε μέν*, that the subject of *δυντελάβετο* persists. But I think that by the sense this is wrong, and on all the counts which I have tried to set out the required subject of *ἔκνυσε* and *ἐνέβαλε* must be Aeschylus.

So we must either accept the change of subject without warning, or, if this seems too abrupt, take a second option to assist the change by providing an object. Since *μιν* and *νιν* (for *μέν*) are alien to the language of Aristophanes, the only possible object is *ἐκείνον*, the accusative giving notice that the subject when it comes will show a change. In favour of *ἐκείνον* is that the exchange 'why didn't he?', 'No he didn't' is a bit of a *non sequitur*. The answer that would more

4 Since the text has *δ' ἐμελλεν* not *δὲ μέλλει*, *νυνί* belongs rather with *καθεδεῖσθαι*: he (then also) formed the resolution that in the contest, which is to take place today, he would . . .

5 The tragedians avoid *δτε δῆ*, as I think does Thucydides except for one instance (2.102.5). This does suggest that to native Athenians the expression, though alternative to *δτε* and *ἐπεί*, may have not been a straight synonym, but have had overtones in more colloquial speech now unknown to us. Of a dozen cases in Aristophanes some admittedly look just like 'when', but the three in *Eccl.* (195, 315, 827) provide some support: duly, eventually, after all. And here too (771) Euripides' arrival was a long time after that of Aeschylus. Denniston gives 'precisely when' (*The Greek Particles*, p.219 § 9.iii). And for *δτε* itself LSJ (s.v. B) can say 'sometimes has a causal sense, *seeing that*'. Obviously they could not meet before this; so Aristophanes must have had some purpose in adding a clause at all, not merely filling space.

6 Words and right hand make a combined welcome at the end of the Doloneia (Il.10.542): *δεξιῇ ἡσπάζοντο ἐπεσὶ τε μείλιχ' αἰσιν*.

7 If the mss had read *Αίσχύλος* would there ever have been a crux?

naturally follow is 'That question doesn't arise'. Aeacus' denial in fact was really concerned not with Sophocles but with Xanthias: 'No, no, you've got the wrong idea. In point of fact Aeschylus gave him a kiss . . .' But *ἐκεῖνον* as object of *ἔκνυε* implies a change of punctuation, written or understood, at some stage in the transmission, the stop being put after the pronoun for Sophocles, thus connecting him with challenge not with kiss. This could have been done if the next word was one which usually came first in its group, e.g. *δὲ*, here meaning 'at least', not 'but' (some examples of *δὲ* not first word in LSJ s.v. I.2.b; cf. Denniston p.13 § 3); or *ἄρ'* mistaken because of the long alpha for the interrogative particle but really = *ἄρα*. Then the impossibility of *μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐκεῖνον* stop would prompt the further changes, in order to make sense.

For such a corruption there should be just enough awkwardness in the true reading to provoke the first variation. And if Stevens can ask us to believe that in 790 the bare pronoun is adequate for the audience to understand that the meaning is 'he, unlike Euripides, you see', is it asking any more of their quickwittedness to suggest that they could understand 'him, unlike Euripides at any rate' in 788, when there is at least a particle to assist them? I can see that *καί* in 787 is a point in favour of 'Sophocles in contrast to Euripides', but the graphic description of the scene with *ἔκνυε* etc. has put Euripides out of our minds and we are all not thinking about Sophocles in his own right. In sentiment the *second* occurrence of the pronoun is much further away than the mere line and a half on paper. And from Aristophanes' point of view is there so much to be gained by labouring the contrast between the two poets with a second *ἐκεῖνος* when the audience can see without this that they fared differently? When Stevens feels the need to add the further argument that the reason for *ἐκεῖνος* 'lies partly in the sense "that famous man"' (which is superfluous as well as unconvincing) I wonder whether this betrays an instinct that he was asking *καὶ ἐκεῖνος* to carry more than it can bear. But, to repeat, these suggestions involving *ἐκεῖνον* are a second option which need only be considered by those who think that the sole emendation to *Αἰσχύλος* gives a sequence which is too unidiomatic.

Since I wrote this article it has been pointed out to me that the emendation *Αἰσχύλος* was proposed by S.A.Naber in *Mnemosyne* ns.11 (1883), 35f., and the passage treated by S.A.Oliphant in *TAPA* 11 (1909), 93ff.. Naber supposed, as I do, that the action of kiss and hand constituted a welcome and cannot come from the one who has newly arrived. He was evidently prepared to accept the sudden change of subject, since he suggested no other change.

Oliphant believes that editors have been wrong to regard the kiss and hand offered by Sophocles as only a greeting. He writes: 'we see in the kiss an earnest or reconciliation and peace after the rivalries of life'. One's immediate reaction to this idea is that if a reconciliation was needed, why could not Aeschylus have suggested it as easily as Sophocles? If Sophocles competed against Aeschylus, did not Aeschylus thereby equally compete against Sophocles? And since the offer of reconciliation, (assuming it was such) was apparently acceptable, it is hardly credible that Aeschylus should have produced in response not a gesture, not a word, unless of course Aeschylus is subject of *ὑπεχώρησεν*.

I can see that there may be a difference between a welcome and a greeting. But Oliphant I think cannot answer Naber's objection – that for the newcomer without preliminary to thrust himself upon the older man is unseemly⁸ – just by adding a second motive. Indeed he aggravates the difficulty, given the enmity he supposes between the two poets up to this very moment, that this would simply make matters worse. Oliphant relies much on the first encounter between them. I think it is rash to believe that, because on that occasion, almost a life-time away, the judges preferred Sophocles' plays to those of Aeschylus, there must have been lasting suspicion and uneasiness now.

But apart from this it is easy to lose sight of the point that at heart it is not Xanthias and Aeacus, nor yet Sophocles and Aeschylus, but Aristophanes who is speaking, and this is not the

⁸ *aduenam osculamur ut intelligat se amari et iucundum hospitem adesse. sed si aduena anteuertit et osculum occupauerit, praesentiam suam obtrudere uidebitur et odium pariet.*

moment for him to pay a compliment to Aeschylus, who had been dead for fifty years. (That comes at the end of the play, when Dionysus chooses him to take back with him to Athens.) When the talk is about as great poet recently dead, *he* ought to be the one receiving the tributes, and for this purpose we want it to be shown what Aeschylus thought of him (or rather what Aristophanes makes him think of him), rather than what he thought of Aeschylus. Best of all would be, if the respects between the two tragedians were mutual, Aeschylus welcoming Sophocles as a poet in his own class, Sophocles declining to contend against Aeschylus for supremacy.

If, as I think, the subject of *ὑπεχώρησεν* must be Sophocles, then with the traditional text we are left without Aeschylus paying any compliment to Sophocles or even showing a flicker of interest in the compliments which Sophocles pays to him. Oliphant thinks that Aeschylus is won over by the magnanimity of Sophocles. But the trouble with this is that he *doesn't* show any emotion or thanks, unless he is subject of *ὑπεχώρησεν* and for Oliphant *ἐκεῖνος* is, of course, Sophocles'. This seems ungenerous and I think would have been considered mean by the audience. As for the audience themselves, I would not be confident to assert that an event before most of them, or Aristophanes, were born would be uppermost in their thoughts now. But if the subject of *ὑπεχώρησεν* is Aeschylus, the, since the sequel is clear that Sophocles did retire, we are forced to suppose that *both* poets gave way – Aeschylus rose and left the throne for Sophocles, who promptly refused it. All this has to be got out of a text which simply states that one of them withdrew.

By far the most common use of *δεξιὰ* in the dramatists, as stated earlier, occurs with one party throwing himself on the other's mercy. But it seems quite inappropriate for either, after so many dramatic triumphs, to feel so inferior. All the uses of *δεξιὰ* other than welcome (which is itself the significance of the kiss) must be ruled out for one reason or another, because an *offer* to take hands, unlike a *request* to take the other's hand, is an assertion of equality, which is something that Sophocles specifically disclaims. So what of reconciliation? What is to be borne in mind, I suggest, is that in any act of reconciliation it is only the stronger who can make the first move.⁹ So which of the two considered himself the stronger? If Aeschylus, as I imagine is the impression conveyed in *Frogs*, then reconciliation is only possible as an explanation, if Aeschylus is subject of *ἐκνυσε*. But the idea of Sophocles, the retiring newcomer, patronising Aeschylus, the older occupant of the throne, is as unconvincing as that of Aeschylus needing to be comforted. The conclusion, then, is that neither poet wants to demonstrate more than equality. Of course, there are, as for George Orwell, degrees of equality: paying tribute is not the same thing as surrendering the status of being the best.

This in particular must be the answer to J.H.Kells, who argues in CR 14.3 (Dec.1964), 232-5, for Aeschylus as subject of *ὑπεχώρησεν* ; but on several counts I am not persuaded. (1) He gives examples to show that *ἐκεῖνος* does not have to require a change of subject according to formal sentence structure; but he believes that here actually it does. This only goes to show that by itself the word is incapable of settling the issue. In addition, I am not convinced that *κακεῖνος* starting a new sentence is no different from *ἐκεῖνος* anywhere else. (2) Kells ignores

⁹ More precisely there are in fact two different situations. (1) Where two parties have been equally hostile, both keeping their ill-will alive. Here, if the feud is ever to end, only the stronger can make a beginning. (2) Where one party has nursed his rancour but not the other. Here the one who still thinks he has a legitimate grievance may decide not to pursue the quarrel further, but formally at least become friendly. Since Oliphant in fact offers no evidence of hostility (and there is none in the ancient lives of the two poets cited in the OCTs), it is not easy to tell which situation he had in mind. But the result is the same, as also if Aeschylus was scared of being defeated by Sophocles. (For if we are still to be thinking about that first encounter, this is what it is likely to mean.) Since we know that Sophocles was *εὐκολος* in both worlds (82), it would have to be Aeschylus who felt the grievance and so it would need to be Aeschylus who first offered the kiss and hand. If he had remembered what judges could do, and did not know in advance that Sophocles was going to be generous, he would have had to agree with his adversary quickly, i.e. act first to placate him. But Aristophanes did not choose to show him like that. It may be admitted that Xanthias, presumably speaking for the audience, would not have been at all surprised if Sophocles had claimed the throne. But Aeacus, who had seen them both in Hades, brushes aside the idea very quickly. The question had to be asked. But I cannot think Aristophanes meant us to feel that Aeschylus was ever in any real danger.

the numerous examples for *ὑποχωρεῖν* meaning withdraw and claims that here it means rise to one's feet from a seated position. He cites no examples to support this sense, but prays in aid the Homeric hymn to Demeter, 188ff., in which *ὑποχωρεῖν* is not even the word used: 'εἰξέ αἱ κλισμοῖο, it will be conceded, is a fair equivalent, in Homeric language of *ὑποχώρησεν αὐτῷ τοῦ θρόνου* in Aristophanic'. It is only so to one who has already decided that Aeschylus rose from his chair. (3) There is already in the text a slight and quite bearable hysteron-proteron, presumably *metri gratia* – two men kissing and then coming within arm's length of each other. The difficulty is aggravated if Aeschylus is struggling to rise to his feet while being embraced by Sophocles. I should have thought he would have stood up as soon as he saw who was coming. (4) Kell's conclusion contains the words 'once we have understood that *ὑποχώρησεν* represents an instantaneous (and temporary) gesture of honour on the part of Aeschylus'. To stand up when someone enters the room is indeed a genuine compliment as far as it goes. But this is not at all what Aeacus and Xanthias are talking about. What is engaging everybody's interest here is, Who is going to sit on the throne from now on? And no one could answer that in advance. For really this is not just any ordinary chair that someone or other might happen to be sitting upon at a given moment. This is a unique throne, one which only one person may sit, and the man in possession will fight to the last to retain it, because once off it, he is off it for good. This is deadly earnest, not drawing-room etiquette. In short, *HHDem.* has nothing to do with it.

Kells offers no argument except on these two words, *ἐκεῖνος* and *ὑποχωρεῖν*. I imagine he would say that all other views of earlier scholars have already been aired and refuted, and there is no need to rehearse the same proposals again. This brings us back to the point at which we started: that the kiss and right hand, which have been treated as empty formalities and so disregarded as insignificant, can guide us to a better understanding of this incident, so important to those who took part in it.

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J.B.Hall (Royal Holloway and Bedford New College): *Notes on Ovid's ex Ponto*

LCM 15.9 (Nov. 1990), 138-139

1.1.29f.

*Si dubitas de me, laudes admitte deorum,
et carmen dempto nomine sume meum.*

The *carmen* is of course Ovid's, and in this context *meum* is as jarring by reason of its prominence as it is unnecessary to the sense of the couplet. More effective would be *merum*, emphasising that the poem would be just a poem, without the author's name.

1.1.35f.

*fert liber Aeneaden, et non iter omne patebit?
at patriae pater hic, ipsius ille fuit.*

The contrast is between the parent of Aeneas, Anchises (33), and the descendant of Aeneas, Augustus, the latter distinguished by being *patriae pater*, whereas the former was no more than the father *ipsius*. '*Quo referas illud ipsius non video*' was the opening of Burman's pertinent note on this passage, and his conjectural suggestion *unius* (prompted by the Frankfurt manuscript's *unicus*) has much more point than *ipsius*. It may be that *unius* is all that is needed, but I have a feeling that *patriae* would be better contrasted with a noun than an adjective. Let me propose, therefore, at least as a stimulus to further consideration of this passage:

at patriae pater hic est, fuit ille uiri.

1.6.49f.

*inque Tomitana iaceam tumulatus harena,
si te non nobis ista uouere liquet.*

The goddess Hope has held Ovid back from committing suicide, and has counselled an offering to the princeps, not of blood, but of tears. The poet continues by entreating Graecinus to

join him in praying that the princeps may be lenient towards him, and in lines 49 and 50, so the manuscripts tell us, expresses the wish that he may die and be buried in Tomis if it is not clear that Graecinus does indeed pray for his pardon. Since, however, there is every chance that Ovid will die and be buried in Tomis, this is rather a back-handed compliment to Graecinus' loyalty to his exiled friend. Furthermore, there is, I suggest, something of a discord between *tumulatus* and *in . . . Tomitana iaceam harena*. That discord will disappear, and the compliment become a properly handsome one, if we restore the word *intumulatus*.

1.10.35f. *unda locusque nocent et causa ualentior istis,
anxietas animi, quae mihi semper adest.*

Ovid's health has suffered dreadfully in exile, and he is now but a pale shadow of his former self. It is not that he has been indulging excessively in drinking (29f.), or feasting (31f.), or sex (33f.), but the harm has been done by the water, the place, and a constant depression. In this context *locus* seems out of place, since the poet's location is a pre-requisite of the poem, and can hardly be described as a less important cause of ill health than *anxietas animi*. A natural complement to *unda* is *cibus*: the more potent cause of the poet's infirmity is his mental state, but the water and the diet have also contributed.

4.12.1f. *quo minus in nostris ponaris, amice, libellis,
nominis efficitur condicione tui.
ast ego non alium prius hoc dignarer honore:
est aliquis nostrum si modo carmen honor.*

It is the prosody of Tuticanus' name which has prevented his putting in an appearance in the *ex Ponto* before now, otherwise no one would have come before him in receiving the honour of a mention. This, I take it, is the drift of these two couplets, but it is not to be found in the Latin as transmitted, where *ast ego* ('but I for my part') erects a barrier between them. A simple alteration will bring the barrier down: write *aut* for *ast*.

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G.Nussbaum (Keele): *The ending of Eclogue I*

LCM 15.9 (Nov. 1990), 139-141

The Spring issue of *Arethusa* (vol.23) carries the overall title: 'Pastoral Revisions', and contains the papers given at a symposium held at Ohio State University. After an introduction 'on how Vergil's pastoral makes a difference' by Professor William Batstone, there follow three pairs of essays in which the second is a response to the first: we have Professors Alpers and Tracy on the *Eclogues*; Ross and Halperin on the *Georgics*; and Johnson and Nortwick on Tibullus. *Eclogue I* features prominently in each of the first three contributions, and particularly its ending, following on from others in probing our 'reader response' to Tityrus' closing invitation to Meliboeus to spend the night with him before betaking himself, with his goats, into distant exile (lines 79-83):

*hic tamen hanc mecum poteris requiescere noctem
fronde super uiridi: sunt nobis mitia poma,
castaneae molles et pressi copia lactis,
et iam summa procul uillarum culmina fumant,
maioresque cadunt altis de montibus umbrae.*

One clue that has been made much of is Tityrus' use of the imperfect tense *poteras*. In R.G.Coleman's 1977 edition we read: "Tityrus' callousness finally melts. . . . The imperfect *poteras* properly implies an unreal condition: 'you could have, had you wished' but it is used to make a somewhat apologetic invitation at Horace *Sat.* 2.1.16 and Ovid *Met.* 1.679." Professor

Tracy (*Arethusa* p.50) translates: 'Still, you might have rested this night here with me', and explains: "The imperfect *poteras* is intentionally ambiguous. It is normally taken as a polite form of invitation: 'you could take your rest' in Alper's translation; by a common idiom in Latin of this verb, it could also convey and, since it is the same word, it *must* also convey a contrary to fact meaning, 'you could have taken your rest'."

I myself was brought up on listings of noun and verb usages – cases, moods, tenses. One of the uses listed for the imperfect indicative was 'the imperfect of the fact just recognised'. An analogy was suggested to the colloquial English 'Were you looking for X?' when we mean 'I've just noticed that you are probably looking for X'. A prime example of the usage in Latin comes in the opening stanza of the Cleopatra Ode (Horace *Odes* 1.37.1-4):

*nunc EST bibendum, nunc pede libero
pulsanda tellus, nunc Saliaribus
ornare pulvinar deorum
tempus ERAT dapibus, sodales.*

We have anaphora with tricolon: *nunc est bibendum, nunc [est] pulsanda, nunc erat tempus*: because the news has just reached us that Cleopatra is dead and gone. The next line goes out of its way to stress that anything of the kind would have been wicked before this moment: *antehac nefas* So *erat* suggests 'the moment we've been waiting for – I've just realised that this is it'.

At the end of *Ecl. I* Tityrus has just realised that, while Meliboeus has been speaking, the day has begun to dwindle and nightfall is at hand, when everyone needs a meal and a bed: the invitation follows. The imperfect tense need not imply any kind of qualification, and if it is translated as 'could' it must be clearly understood that this is only so as to be in line with normal polite English usage. Vergil could have written *potuisti*, perhaps followed by *acquiescere* (as in Catullus 31.10 *desideratoque acquiescimus lecto*) and that would indeed have implied 'could have' – but surely not so *poteras*, which does not even need the apology of being called 'apologetic'.

Professor Batstone makes much of the absence of a reply from Meliboeus to Tityrus' invitation, "ambiguous because of the notorious *poteras*" (*Arethusa* p.10). He leaves open both possibilities, refusal or acceptance: the poem ends not with Tityrus' last words, but with Meliboeus' silence. This contributes to the poem's total ambiguity: 'in this way the poem exploits the power of its own failed image, to create in its failure, or despite its failure, an imagination of extraordinary value, one which has polarised readers who want their imagination confirmed or denied' (p.12). Professor Tracy is more certain. Recalling Polyphemus' failed invitation to Galatea from *Idyll 11*, 'thou wilt pass the night more pleasantly in the cave with me . . .' he concludes "Tityrus' invitation falls on deaf ears. Meliboeus does not accept, but continues on his journey out of pastoral" (p.51). Professor Batstone accepts that the ending contains a 'narrative ambiguity' about whether the invitation is accepted or not, but denies that there is an ambiguity of *poesis* (p.12). "Tityrus' invitation fails because, even if it were accepted, it would do not good and, even if it failed, that would not erase the longing for and value of the moment it projects" (p.14). To be sure, near the end of his long speech, Meliboeus had told his goats to be on their way (line 74) *ite meae felix quondam pecus, ite capellae*.

But that was before Tityrus noticed that it was near sunset. Professor Tracy translates the last word *umbrae* as 'darkness', and finds both *procul* and *uillarum* to be baleful in tone. It is good to make us think again. But what we have are the lengthening shadows of sunset, not the darkness of night, and though villas with their fires are not for the likes of Tityrus any more than they are for Meliboeus, Tityrus has already made his homely alternative very attractive. If we are intended to be aware of the possibility of Meliboeus refusing, then we must also envisage him driving his goats by night. Of course Meliboeus accepts – to do otherwise, and drive his animals through the night, would simply be bizarre. That still leaves plenty of scope for ambivalence in the ending as in the whole poem. Tityrus' *tamen* concedes that all Meliboeus has been saying is true: he and his goats will indeed have to continue their journey out of the pastoral world – but not tonight. For Meliboeus to refuse would simply be unreal;

to speak some words of acceptance risks sentimentality or at least a weakened ending. Moreover, in those poems whose spoken dialogue offers itself for closest comparison – 3.1-54 Menalcas and Damoetas, discounting Palaemon; 5 and 9 – it seems to be Vergil's practice to let one speaker open and the other close, as in our poem.

In deciding whether we are intended to 'hear' Meliboeus' silence in response to the invitation, we do need to take account of any sense of closure which the text exercises on our minds. Like so many of Horace's *Odes*, this poem ends with a word-painting which calls for a still point or arrested moment: we do not expect anything further, so the fact that nothing follows is not significant. This impression is reinforced when we read and hear the lines aloud, as of course we should. Coleman (who also notes that four other *Eclogues* end with nightfall – 2, 6, 9 and 10) writes: 'The tranquil beauty of this closing couplet is enhanced by the sonorities of the L, U and nasal sounds'. The resonance, typically rich, arises above all from the recurrence of PR, CP and CL already anticipated in *pressi copia lactis*: then the UMs of *s - UM-ma* and *UM-brae* (short Us), from *f-UM-ant* (long U) and *uillar-UM* (nasalised long U), all but the last three falling on a coincidence of verse-beat with word-accent; three MAs and three NTs. The final line does not have the triple cadence (coincidence of ictus and accent on the last *three feet* as in the penultimate line, not just the normal two), which Vergil often uses to close a period. But it is a fine and ample five-line period, with identical scansion (but not accentuation) of the last two lines:

*et iam summa procul uillarum culmina fumant,
maioresque cadunt altis de montibus umbrae.*

I think M. Winterbottom had it right: "Tityrus can do no more than offer him a lodging for the night; tomorrow he must go on" ('Virgil and the confiscations', *Greece and Rome* April 1965; now reprinted in *Virgil*, edd. McAuslan and Walcott, 1990, p.66.

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Review: **Peter K. Marshall** (Amherst College)

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Leofranc Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius*, London, Duckworth 1988 (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1989). Pp.xvii + 284. Cloth, £35.00

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Recent years have seen something of a revival of interest in the less frequently read Latin writers of the later second century A.D.. Fronto has been particularly fortunate, with an excellent study by Edward Champlin, *Fronto and Antonine Rome* (Harvard UP 1980), and a new Teubner text, *M. Cornelius Fronto. Epistulae*, by M.P.J. van den Hout (Leipzig 1988), who was granted access to the papers of Edward Hauler, and has thus been able to produce a text vastly superior to his original edition of 1954 (Leiden, Brill). It is noteworthy that van den Hout also promises a commentary, something to which all who have laboured in this difficult terrain will look forward with much eagerness. Against this background it is a particular pleasure to welcome this new study by Holford-Strevens (H-S), who has produced a steady stream of informative and often provocative articles on this author since his (unfortunately still unpublished) Oxford D.Phil. thesis of 1971, *Select Commentary on Aulus Gellius Book 2*.

Gellius, to be sure, has attracted a certain amount of attention in this century. One thinks particularly of the work of the Doyen of such studies, René Marache, who in 1952 produced the stimulating essay *La Critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du gout archaïsant au II^e siècle de notre ère* (Rennes, Plihon) a work rendered all the more touching in that it was conceived while Marache was a prisoner of war ('*L'idée qui préside à cet ouvrage m'est venue en captivité . . C'était une tâche bénie pour un prisonnier*'). This was followed by *Mots nouveaux et mots archaïques chez Fronton et Aulu-Gelle* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957). Despite some errors and omissions (and the obvious need to reexamine everything in Fronto in the light of van den Hout's fresh text) this is still a valuable work of reference. Furthermore, in addition to a considerable number of major articles,

Marache has so far produced two volumes of the Budé edition of the *Noctes Atticae*. Much activity too on the part of Italian and, to a lesser extent, German scholars.

But what of the English-speaking world? The very diversity, if not profundity, of Gellius' subject-matter has inevitably led to an alarming number of articles in learned journals, largely confined to the elucidation of a single chapter or theme. Studies of a wider range are not that frequent. Over two centuries one might perhaps single out a handful, beginning with the three volumes of the translation, with notes, by W. Beloe (London 1795), a fascinating character, who (amidst much else) was the author of the delightful work *The Sexagenarian; or the Recollections of a Literary Life* (London 1817, 2 vols.). More critical, and still to be read with profit, is H. Nettleship's article 'The *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius' ('Public Lecture, Summer Term, 1883' it is headed) published in *AJP* 4 (1883), 391-415 (= *Lectures and Essays*, Oxford 1885, 248-276). In this century one thinks of M.D. Brock's *Studies in Fronto and his Age* (Cambridge 1911), at least in parts. The three volumes of the Loeb of John C. Rolfe (Harvard, 1927-28) at the worst made Gellius accessible to a much larger audience than he had previously enjoyed, and the Introduction, however wrong-headed at times, sets out some of the general themes which a reading of the *Noctes* inevitably suggests. Rolfe was also responsible for the brief entry in *OCD*¹ (revised by this reviewer for the second edition). That all-too-rare phenomenon for Gellius, a commentary on an individual book, Book I, was produced by H.M. Hornsby (Dublin UP Series 1936) as the first of its kind in English, and this has been followed by the unpublished commentary on Book II of H-S mentioned above, and the earlier work of W. W. Kurth, *A Commentary on Book XIII of the Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius* (Dissertation, Chapel Hill, NC, 1964), which, while not published, is presumably readily available on microfilm (North Carolina not being as obstructive as some other institutions). Most recently we may note H.D. Jocelyn, 'Studies in the Indirect Tradition of Plautus' *Pseudolus*. III The Archaising Movement'. Republican Comedy and Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*' (*BICS Supplement* 51, 1988, *Vir Bonus Discendi Peritus: Studies in celebration of Otto Skutsch's eightieth birthday*, pp.57-72), which has much to offer on Gellius in general.

Yet H-S is in many ways much more ambitious in this new book, which seeks to cover a large variety of topics in a comparatively short space. The whole is broken down into three main parts: 1. The Man and his Book (subdivided into Life and Dates; Composition and Purpose; Language and Style; Presentation and Sources; 2. Preceptors and Acquaintances (Teachers; Favorinus; Honoured Orators); 3. Scholarship and Study (Scholarly Reading; the Latin Language; Roman Orators and Poets; Greek: Language, Poets, Orators; History; Philosophy [with an Excursus: Religion, Superstition, and the Supernatural]; Other Sciences: Rhetoric, Law, Medicine; Weak Spots and Blind Spots). Clearly any of these parts could be expanded into a book in itself, and this effort at compression has its effect on the writing. At times it is so dense that there is a loss in clarity. Thus one may doubt the meaning of the assertion (p.116) 'There is no other mention of Manilius' (In Gellius? Anywhere else?) or (p.124) 'Scaurus does not appear in any other chapter' (when the chapter in question, 11.15, was last mentioned a page earlier, and much further citation has intervened). Moreover, in a study of an author fond of archaism (or 'mannerism', as H-S more helpfully styles it) it is both bewildering and amusing to come across similar striving for the occasional *inauditum atque insolens verbum* in English (a splendid example is the verb 'bewray', found on p.64, and listed by *OED*² most recently in 1867, and by that time long a conscious archaism).

Perhaps the same constraints of space have led to two notable omissions, one seemingly unfelt, the other quite deliberate. First, we may perhaps pose the question: How many people ever sit down and read Gellius from cover to cover? Probably no more than would do the same for Servius. Most scholars would presumably confine their attention to specific chapters relevant to their general interest. It may very well be the case that the readership for the book under review will be similarly selective, and scholars will wish to consult matter relevant to specific themes and concerns. This places an important emphasis on any index. H-S provides only one, a conflation of an *Index Nominum* and an *Index Rerum* (the latter being largely, but not exclusively, on English words). Badly missed is anything approaching

an index of passages cited from the text of Gellius. However inviting it may be to follow up references given to 'cats' eyes', 'cryptochism', 'yawning' or 'Zarmanochegas', this is not the easiest way to find what one needs in Gellius, and an *Index Locorum* would have made this study vastly more accessible.

While it is not fair to fault a scholar for not writing what he explicitly says he does not intend to provide (Preface p.x), yet perhaps it is legitimate to regret the absence of any sustained study of Gellius' *Nachleben*. H-S, rightly in some ways, observes that 'an adequate account of Gellius' presence in the works of later ages would require not a single chapter but another book or more'. True. As he notes, Hertz long ago devoted many pages to a presentation of most of the evidence, but this is merely the bare bones of the story. Much remains to be said on the light to be shed on several aspects of cultural history from some pertinent enquiry in this area. *Why* and *how* was Gellius so freely used by writers as diverse as Lactantius and Macrobius? What was the appeal which made Augustine describe him as *uir elegantissimi eloquii et multae ac facundae scientiae* (CD 9.4)? And what principles were employed in constructing the Mediaeval anthologies which contain so much of Gellius, particularly that already circulating in the Twelfth Century, containing extensive excerpts from Gellius and Valerius Maximus? The story doubtless begins much earlier, the first example of anything approaching such 'anthologizing' being apparently the singling out of NA 3.6 (*De ui atque natura palmae arboris, quod lignum ex ea ponderibus positis renitatur*) in some ninth century Northern French manuscripts. A long and most complicated story, to be sure, but one infinitely worth the telling. A pity that H-S (who clearly knows this material well) did not feel free to give at least a summary account of this fascinating tale. There is, to be sure, a final Appendix on *Editions and Translations*, but this does not go very far, and is much too concerned to dwell upon the howlers of previous generations – amusing, yes, but not very edifying. Far more could be done on this theme.

With these general cavils set aside, it must be observed that this book is a splendid and important contribution to our understanding of an often enigmatic author. A large portion of it serves, in effect, as a detailed, although highly selective, commentary on the text. The necessary conciseness of presentation means inevitably that toes are being stepped on at virtually any point. A handful of examples are given to show the kind of controversy which is raised. It should, however, be emphasised that throughout H-S is scrupulously honest and always alert to the possibilities of disagreement.

The question of the date of publication of the *Noctes Atticae* is notoriously complicated, and over the years H-S has contributed much to the elucidation of the principal problems. A work whose composition may have extended over several decades is not likely to admit of a simple dating. The late date proposed here by H-S is one which surely commands assent, but there remains the annoying question of the apparent indebtedness to Gellius of Apuleius in the *Apologia* 9.6-8 (a work dates to 158/9, a time far too early for the *Noctes* to have been published). To counter this, H-S proposes an intimacy between the two writers, allowing for some form of personal communication before anything was formally published by Gellius. So we read (p.17) 'But his [Apuleius'] period of study in Athens overlapped with Gellius' own; they could have met again in Rome, perhaps as guests of Apuleius' leading compatriot Fronto Apuleius, having returned to Africa, would remain in Gellius' mind as the 'adulescens' he had known'. All possible, no doubt, but far simpler is the theory long ago proposed by Usener (and quoted by H-S) that Gellius and Apuleius both drew on the same source, perhaps an anthology containing the epigram in question.

The chapter 'Language and Style' (pp.35-46), necessarily drawing heavily on the work of Marache, in some ways does both too much and too little. Such a complicated question seems hardly tractable in so short a span. As has been suggested above, perhaps the whole subject should be reopened in the light of the radically different text of Fronto now available, and also in view of the clearer sense we now have of what in fact Gellius wrote. Studies such as Marache's were based ultimately on the text of Hertz, and this means that ghosts still walk. A fine example is afforded on p.37, note 26, where H-S, seeking examples of the *rerum gerendi* construction, includes 7.14.4. with the remark "Hertz, but not

Marshall, reports 'imponendi poenae' in V". The reason is simply that Hertz was wrong (as Marache also tacitly notes in his Budé text), and Gellius clearly wrote the 'normal' *imponendae*.

Several chapters in Gellius set a scene in which he, or some other authority, has encountered an interesting variant in an 'old manuscript'. It does not seem at all clear that we are justified in accepting these stories at face value – they afford so neat a *mise-en-scène* that one's suspicions are virtually automatic, although H-S (p.140) is quite ready to believe ("The manuscripts' existence need not be doubted"). But even if we are ready to set aside our doubts, what are we to make of the further assertion (p.139) "There was of course no way that Gellius or his contemporaries could ascertain the history of a manuscript"? Why not? Were they incapable of telling the difference between the script of 150 A.D. and that of a period a century and a half earlier? Or of looking for marks of ownership? It is precisely the absence of such indications that tends to remove credibility from such tales.

It is to be hoped that one result of the publication of this book will be an increased interest in the work of Gellius. The picture of that writer given here is both astute and duly sympathetic – one notes the balanced admixture of such verdicts as "He is not only acute, but so far as we can see a pioneer among his countrymen, in the attention he devotes to syntax" (p.135) and "poor floundering Gellius" (p.172 n.50). Best of all is the judgement delivered in the *Epilogue* (pp.238-9) "For all his limitations, he is a delightful companion, full of charm and not without intelligence". Let us hope that Gellius can now have his rightful place in the the history of Latin Letters.

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D.S.Barrett (Queensland): *Lucretius' snake*, DRN 3.657-9

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Bailey's OCT (2nd Edition) reads:

*quin etiam tibi si lingua vibrante minanti
serpentis cauda procero corpore †utrumque†
sit libitum in multas partis discidere ferro, . . .*

His commentary gives a good overview of the difficulties presented by these lines.

This note, however, contends that *micanti cauda* at least should occasion no difficulty whatsoever. For one thing, *minanti* has overwhelming MS support. Yet scholars have been considerably exercised by the word.

Bailey accepts it wholeheartedly but explains it as 'erect and threatening'. Lachmann reads *micanti*, which Bailey claims 'really weakens the picture'.

Kenney, while reading *minanti*, contends it 'spoils the picture, being at variance with the facts of natural history (which Lucretius might have been expected to know) and with traditional descriptions'.

There are good grounds, however, for suggesting that Bailey's 'erect' is wrong; that Lachmann, while wrong, is much nearer the mark than Bailey allows; and that Kenney does Lucretius an injustice.

Many snakes, when they are excited, vibrate their tails back and forth long the ground. Hence the reasonableness of Lachmann's *micanti* and the unlikelihood of Bailey's 'erect'. If this occurs in dry grass or leaves, it results in an audible whirring noise. It is perfectly appropriate to describe this behaviour as 'threatening'; the most notable example of the phenomenon is the rattlesnake, which vibrates its horny tail at something like fifty times a second; the rattle is a warning to enemies.

Granted, Lucretius knew nothing of rattlesnakes: they belong almost exclusively to North America. But he knew more about snakes than Kenney allows. Indeed, his powers of acute observation are underscored by his entire description of a snake cut into multiple parts.

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